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Public Participation
in Hazard.Management:
The Use of Citizen Panels in the U.S.
Ortwin Renn, Thomas Webler
and Branden B. Johnson*
Introduction
Americans increasingly question decisions of professional risk
managers. This trend is most apparent in the areas of nuclear, hazardous

chemical and solid waste management. Professionals and the general
public strongly disagree about the seriousness of many risks. 1 The
professionals use the expected losses per time unit as the major
yardstick to evaluate risks. The public is more concerned about long
term effects, inequitable siting, lack of personal control, and the pace of
technological diffusion into their cultural environment. Citizens also

distrust the ability to monitor and control unintended consequences. 2
* Professor Renn teaches in the Environment, Technology and Society Program
and is a Senior Researcher at the the Center for Environment, Technology and
Society, Clark University. Mr Webler is a doctoral candidate in the ETS program at
Clark, and Dr. Johnson is a research scientist with the N.J. Department of
Environmental Protection.
1 Allen, Towards a Holistic Appreciation of Risk: The Challenge for
CommunicatorsandPolicymakers,12 SCL TECH. AND HUMAN VALUES 138 (1987).
2 M. PINSDORF, COMMUNICATING WHEN YOUR COMPANYIS UNDER SIEGE (1987);
B. FIscHHOFF, S.LICHTENSTEIN, P. SLoVIC, S.DERBY &R. KEENEY, ACCEPTABILE RISK
(1981); 0. RENN, MAN, TECHNOLOGY, AND RISK (Jilich Nuclear Research Center
Research Report Jiil-Spez-91, 1981), Renn, Technology, Risk, and Public
Perception,4 ANGEWANDTE SYSTEMANALYSE/APP!ED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 50

(1983); Borcherding, Rohrmann & Eppel, A PsychologicalStudy on the Cognitive
Structure of Risk Evaluations, in NEW DIRECTIONS INRESEARCH ON DECISION
MAKING 245 (B. Brehmer, H. Jungermann, P. Lourens & G. Sevon eds. 1986);
Kasperson, Six Propositionsfor Public Participationand Their Relevance for Risk
2 RISK - Issues in Health &Safety 197 [Summer 1991]

Decision making should assure that risk management is both
efficient and sensitive to public concerns. This paper discusses a novel
way to meet both needs. The model was developed in West Germany 3
and, after some alterations, was first applied in the U.S. in a sludge
disposal question in New Jersey.
Problems of Participation in Risk Management
Traditionally, risk managers have regarded public involvement as a
mandated, but often unwelcome, intrusion into the planning process.
Often, they decide first how to deal with a risk problem and then inform
the public. This strategy has not been successful for a variety of
reasons. First, citizens feel cheated when asked to participate, only to
learn that the decision has already been made. Second, risk managers
are often uninformed about the concerns of citizens and experience in
the community. Third, the rationale used to make trade-offs between
different risk and benefit dimensions is rarely compelling for citizens.
Often, decisions evoke conflicts between risk minimization and equity.
For example, disposing of externally generated waste may minimize
overall public risk, but is unlikely be accepted by a host community.
Informing the public may help clarify issues, but cannot resolve
conflicts caused not by ignorance, but diverging interests among
industry, regulators, stakeholders, and the affected public. It has been
suggested that communities be compensated for additional risk burdens,
4
but this alone has been unable to win public acceptance.
Communication,6 RISK ANALYSIS 275 (1986); Fessenden-Raden, Fitchen &Heath,
ProvidingRisk Information in Communities:FactorsInfluencing What is Heardand
Accepted, 12 Sci. TECH. AND HUMAN VALUES 94 (1987); Johnson, Public
Concerns and the Public Role in Siting Nuclear and Chemical Waste Facilities,11
ENviL. MoMT. 571 (1987).
3 P. DIENEL, Dis PLANNUNGSZELLE (1978).
4 Otway, Perception andAcceptance of EnvironmentalRisk, 2 ZE1rSCHRIFr FOR
UMWELTPOLMiK 593 (1980); Renn, Risk Analysis: A Need to Communicate, 4 F.
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Inviting the public to participate from the start improves the
likelihood that a resulting decision will be accepted. However, this may
be resisted because citizens concerned with health risks may recommend
expensive programs to achieve relatively small risk reductions. Also,
"the public" consists of many groups with different preferences.
Without a procedure to reach consensus, the public's position is likely
to be unclear.
Levels of Conflict in the Risk Debate
The premise that risk managers have as much to learn from the
public as the public has to learn from them has become almost a truism
in treatises on risk communication. It is, however, still missing in
practice. 5 Two-way communication is clearly a prerequisite for
interactive learning, but it is often difficult to implement. The institution
which initiates the action must be flexible, willing to adapt and to
explore citizens' concerns.
What are the characteristics of a risk debate? Several classifications
have been offered in the literature. The traditional decision analytic view
classifies risk conflicts as conflicts about facts, probabilities, values,
and procedures. 6 In a report to the government, the German Academy
of Sciences endorsed this classification and found it helpful for
designing instruments for conflict resolution. 7 However, G. Majone
86 (1989) [hereinafter Risk Analysis].
5 Covello, von Winterfeldt & Slovic, Risk Communication: A Review of the
Literature, 3 RISK ABSTRACTS 171 (1986); Johnson, Accounting for the Social
Context of Risk Communication, 5 SCI. AND TECH. STUD. 103 (1987); Renn,
Evaluation of Risk Communication: Concepts, Strategies, and Guidelines, in
Managing Environmental Risks Air Pollution Control Association International
Speciality Conference 99 (APCA ed. 1988); Zimmermann, A Process Framework
FOR APPLIED RES. PUB. POLY

for Risk Communication, 12 SCI., TECH., AND HUMAN VALUES 131 (1987).

6

von Winterfeldt, Detlof & Edwards, Patterns of Conflict About Risky

Technologies,4 RISK ANALYSIS 55 (1984).
7

GERMAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, UMWELTSTANDARDS AM BEISPIEL DES

2 RISK - Issues in Health &Safety 197 [Summer 1991]

has recently criticized the decision analytic framework and found it
unsuitable for a plausible taxonomy of risk conflicts. Instead he
proposed to classify risk debates with respect to the type of evidence
and arguments used to justify different positions. 8 He distinguishes
between scientific, legal, political, and anecdotal evidence and describes
various forms of conflict resulting from incongruities between these
forms of evidence. A similar argument is made by N. Luhmann who
associates conflicts with the inability of each party (or camp)
representing one system of evidence to communicate the inevitable
contradictions within this system of evidence to other parties. 9
Ravetz and Funtowitz have tried to integrate both approaches by
developing a taxonomy based on the different types of evidence and
argumentation, but still remains within the traditional framework of
decision analysis with its distinction between facts and values. 10 S.
Rayner and R. Cantor adopted this generic approach and applied it more
specifically to conflicts about risks. 11 According to this view, risk
debates fall into three levels as illustrated in Figure 1, below.
The first level involves factual arguments about risk probabilities
and the extent of potential damage. If the problem is a lack of technical
knowledge on the part of the public, procedures should focus on
informing the public with the consensual expert opinions. In this case,
participation is equivalent to successful risk communication. While
scientists and risk managers are most comfortable with this type of
STRAUIENSCHtIZES (in press).

G. MAJONE,
(1989).
8

EVIDENCE, ARGUMENT, AND PERSUASION IN THE POLICY PROCESS

N. LUIMANN, OKOLOGISCHE KOMMuNIATON (1986).
10 Funtowitz & Ravetz, Three Types of Risk Assessment: A Methodological

9

Analysis, in RISK ANALYSIS IN T-E PRIVATE SECTOR (C. Whipple & V. Covello
eds. 1985).

11 Rayner & Cantor, How Fair is Safe Enough? The Cultural Approach to
Societal Technology Choice, 7 RISK ANALYSIS 3 (1987).
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debate, it rarely comprises the whole of a conflict.
Figure 1
Three Levels of Conflict in Risk Debates
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At this level the focus of the debate is
on the distribution of risks and benefits, and the compatibility of the
proposed solution with current economic, political, and social
conditions. This type of debate does not rely on technical expertise,
although reducing scientific uncertainty may help. The emphasis on
personal and institutional judgments and experience requires more than
risk communication; it needs input from stakeholder groups and affected
populations. Approval in this situation is gained by showing that the
risk management institution has been competent, effective, and open to
public demands.
At the third level, the conflict is defined along different social
values, cultural lifestyles, and their impact on risk management. In this
2 RISK -Issues in Health &Safety 197 [Summer 1991]

case, neither technical expertise nor institutional competence and
openness are adequate conditions for public approval. Decision making
here requires a fundamental consensus on the issues that underlie the
risk debate. The nuclear debate in the 1970's in Sweden leading to a
national referendum is an example of conflict resolution at the third
level. It was the culmination of extensive debate about the desired
direction of technological development in which nuclear power served
as a symbol for large centralized technologies and its impacts on
economics and society. 12 The final vote to continue nuclear power for
a limited period of time defined the legitimate role that nuclear power
should play within the larger technological scenario. The majority
evaluated nuclear power plants as undesired but necessary until
alternative technologies could replace them. Replacement should be
completed by the year 2010, after which all nuclear power plants are
scheduled to be phased out. This agreement moved the issue from the
third to the second level, where technical and organizational solutions
could be discussed without the debate expanding into a conflict over the
moral implications of nuclear power and its symbolic meanings.
The form of public participation should vary depending on which
level the risk debate takes place. Even the best technical expertise and
the most profound competence cannot overcome unresolved social,
cultural, and political value conflicts. To resolve conflicts at the third
level, neither education nor incorporating stakeholders' interests is
sufficient. The affected citizens must be brought into the decision
making process.
There is, however, a strong tendency for risk management agencies
to reframe higher level conflicts into lower levels ones: third level
conflicts are presented as first or second level conflicts, and second level
conflicts as first level. This is an attempt to focus the discussion on
12 Nelkin & Pollak, The Politics of Participationin the Nuclear Debate in
Sweden, the Netherlands,and Austria,25 PUB. PoLy 333 (1981).
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technical evidence, in which the agency is fluent. 13 Citizens who
participate in these distorted discourses are thus forced to use first level
(factual) arguments to rationalize their value concerns. Unfortunately,
this is often misunderstood by risk managers as "irrationality" on the
part of the public. Frustrated, the public retreats to due process and
routinization of the process, abscising it of substance, and departs with
disillusion and distrust of the system.
Citizen Panels for Policy Evaluation and Recommendation
Many models for public participation that promise to accomplish the
integration of different types of evidence and public preferences have
been suggested in the literature. 14 This is not the place to discuss these
models in detail. In this paper we want to focus on a specific model of
citizen participation which was developed by P.C. Dienel of the
University of Wuppertal for public participation in planning processes in
West Germany. 15 With several modifications, we applied this model in
13 Dietz, Stem & Rycroft, Definitions of Conflict and the Legitimation of
Resources: The Case of EnvironmentalRisk, 4 Soc. F. 47 (1989).
14 CENTERFOR NEW DEmOCRATICPROCESSES, -INALREPORTOFTHE CrrIzENs PANEL

ON AGRICULTURE AND WATER QUALITY (1985); Crosby, Kelly & Schaefer, Citizens
Review Panels:A New Approach to Citizen Participation,46 PUB. ADMIN. R. 170
(1986); Kraft, Evaluating Technology Through Public Participation:The Nuclear
Waste Disposal Controversy, in TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICS 253 (M. Kraft & N.
Vig eds. 1988); T. BURNS & R. UBERHORST, CREATIVE DEMOCRACY: SYSTEMATIC
CoNFLICT RESOLUTION AND POLICYMAKING IN A WORLD OF HIGH SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY (1988); Chen & Mattes, Value Oriented Social DecisionAnalysis: A
Communication Tool for Public Decision Making on Technological Projects, in

(C. Viek & G.
Cvetkovich eds. 1989); see reviews in Nelkin & Pollak, The Politics of
SOCIAL DECISION METHODOLOGY FOR TECHNOLOGICAL PROJEcTS

Participationin the Nuclear Debate in Sweden, the Netherlands, and Austria, 25
PUB. POL'Y 333 (1981); Pollak, Public Participation,in REGULATING INDUSTRIAL
RISK 76 (H. Otway & M. Peltu eds. 1985); Fiorino, Citizen Participationand
Environmental Risk: A Survey of Institutional Mechanisms, 15 Sci., TECH., AND
HUMAN VALUES 226 (1990).

15 P. DIENEL, supra note 3; Dienel, Contributing to Social Decision
Methodology: Citizen Reports on Technological Projects, in SOCIAL DECISION
2 RISK - Issues in Health &Safety 197 [Summer 1991]

two applications: a study on energy policies in West Germany, and a
study on sludge disposal strategies in the U.S. The German case study
has been documented elsewhere. 16 We report on the sludge disposal
project here. 17 The model is similar to the approach taken by the Center
18
for New Democratic Processes (CNDP) in Minneapolis.
Our approach of organizing citizen panels for policy evaluation and
recommendation is an attempt to cope with a multivalue, multiactor,
multiinterest, decision making. It is essential to incorporate all relevant
players in manners appropriate to their interests, knowledge, and
rationalities. The goal is to inform panels of randomly selected citizens
about various policy options and potential consequences and to have
them draft recommendations and evaluations with respect to these
policies based on their preferences and values.
Citizen panels in our model consist of a group of about 20 to 25
randomly selected citizens who are given paid leave from their work
obligations to serve as "value consultants" in a three to four day
process. 19 Their role is to review the testimonies of experts and
stakeholders, investigate potential benefits and risks, and assign tradeoffs between various options on the basis of their personal values. The
METIODOLOGYIUR TECHNOLOGICAL PROJECTS (C. Vlek & G. Cvetkovich eds. 1989)

[hereinafter Contributingto Social Decision].
16 O. RENNETAL., SOZIALVEIRTAGLTCHEENERGIEPOL1iK: EIN GUTACHTENFOR DIE

BUNDESREGIRUNG (1985) [hereinafter SOZIALVERTRAGLICHE ENERGIEPOLrTIK]; Renn,

Decision Analytic Tools for Resolving Uncertainty in the Energy Debate, 93
NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND DESIGN 167 (1986) [hereinafter Decision Analytic

Tools].

17 For further information, see 0. RENN ET AL., CITIZEN PARTICIPATION FOR

SLUDGE MANAGEMENT. FINAL REPORT TO THE NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECnION (Center for Environment, Technology, and Develop-

ment 1989).
18 Crosby, Kelly & Schaefer, Citizens Review Panels: A New Approach to
Citizen Participation,46 PUB. ADMIN. R. 170 (1986).
19 P. DIENEL, supra note 3.

Renn et al.: Citizen Panels for Hazard Management 205

output is a recommended solution for the pre-defined problem. 2 0 The
process relies heavily upon a clear mandate of the decision making
institution to seriously consider implementing the recommendations of
the panels, the involvement of randomly selected citizens, and assuring
their legitimacy in the eyes of other citizens and stakeholders.
Information Needs of Panelists
Informing participants about options and likely consequences is the
vital part of the procedure. Different forms of evidence require different
forms of presentation. 2 1 In reference to the three levels of conflict, the
content of the information material and the structure of its presentation
must match the requirements for each conflict level. For a
comprehensive understanding of a political issue, the panelists need to
be informed about the potential impacts of each policy option (expert
judgments), the agency performance records in managing the risk under
consideration, and stakeholder values and interests with respect to the
risk source. With this in mind, they then must reflect on their own
values and interests.
The assessment of potential impacts of each policy option is done
prior to the meetings of the panels. Experts in relevant fields are
gathered to validate the technical information which will be input to the
panel. The method used is Group Delphi, in which a small group of
experts convene for one day to review the state of current consensus on
technical knowledge relevant to the various options under
consideration. 22 This is a variation of the conventional Delphi exercise
20 P. DIENEL, NEW OPTIONs FORPARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY

(1980); Contributing

to Social Decision, supra note 15; P. DIENEL & D. GARBE, ZUKUNFnGE
ENERGIEPOLUTK EIN BORGERGUTACHTEN ( 1986); Renn, Stegelmann, Albrecht, Kotte

& Peters, An EmpiricalInvestigation of Citizens' Preferences Among FourEnergy
Scenarios,26 TECH. FORECASTNG AND Soc. CHANGE 11 (1984); references, supra

note 16.
21 Renn, supra note 4.
22 Webler et al., A Novel Approach to Reducing Uncertainty: The Group Delphi,
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in which series of questionnaires are repetitiously answered by an expert
panel. In each subsequent round, the anonymous results of the previous
round, along with justifying arguments, are delivered with the new
questionnaire. Experts are then able to reassess their original opinions in
light of each others' responses and issue a better informed opinion
without the hinderance of being committed to an original response.
The group process preserves all of the features of the conventional
exercise except anonymity, which is surrendered in exchange for
efficiency. Experts are initially brought together in a plenary to meet and
receive introductory material. They are then divided into small groups of
three to five and given the questionnaire. Each small group works
privately and tries to reach consensus on each item. The organizers
compile the results of round one and present them to the plenary where
groups with diverging opinions are asked to justify their responses.
After hearing the arguments, the small group membership is shuffled,
and round two is conducted. The results of round two are compiled, and
the plenary is reconvened. This process is repeated until it is clear that
convergence has been obtained.
The Group Delphi has proven effective for resolving uncertainty
about factual knowledge. It brings a convenience in both time and effort
over the conventional Delphi but at the cost of surrendering anonymity
and presenting only a "snapshot" of the understanding among panelists
during that one day. Because the justification for positions are given
face-to-face, its efficiency in resolving uncertainty is very good. Three
other benefits are that any intentional or unintentional ambiguities are
immediately reconciled, the justifications for dissenting opinions
provide secondary insights into the understanding that emerges, and
consistency is internally checked.
TECH. FOREcAsTING AND SOC. CHANGE (May 1991); SozIALVERTRAGICHE ENERGIEPOLMIK, supra note 16.
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In this manner, differences about factual evidence (first level
conflict) can be resolved or contained outside of the citizen panels. It is
not expected that the experts will resolve all conflict, but dissent must be
clearly defined so that the range of opinion can be conveyed fully to the
citizen panel. Furthermore, the major spokespersons of opposing camps
may be invited to the citizen panel to express their viewpoint directly to
the citizens, and to make themselves available for questioning. As in
jury trials, expert witnesses are called before the assemblage to present
their perspective and reasoning, and to be cross-examined by the
participants. All uncontested actual information can be conveyed by
formal lectures and written summary material.
The Group Delphi serves two purposes: it presents the consensual
knowledge and areas of dissent within the scientific community, and it
shows that every effort has been made to assemble unbiased and
accurate information. The results provide the necessary information to
clarify and resolve conflicts on the first level of debate without imposing
any solution on second and third level debates.
Conflicts about the second level of debate necessitate information
from within a managing agency and from outside analysts of the
agency's performance. This occurs within the citizen panel structure.
Claims of competence or incompetence can best be evaluated by having
representatives of the respective agencies or industries and their critics
present their arguments to the panel and provide evidence to justify their
claims. If the issue itself or the reputation of the managing agency is
highly controversial, the adversarial camps are often unable to present
their arguments in a face-to-face confrontation (or they may lose the
audience by retreating to a special technical jargon). In these cases it is
more advisable to use videotaped statements of the major parties in the
debate. 23 Videotaping provides each party with the opportunity to
structure their arguments in line with the panels' interests and to retape
23 Risk Analysis, supra note 4.
2 RISK - Issues in Health &Safety 197 [Summer 19911

their statements as often as they deem necessary to present a persuasive
argument. Of course, all camps must be equally represented and allowed
to present their own cases.
Debates on the third level require extensive communication about
Values and lifestyles. These topics are subjects of small group sessions
(3-5 participants) and plenary discussions in which the citizens consider
values and criteria for assessing the various options. The method of
value tree analysis is typically employed to expose values, and thus
make value-based argument transparent. To be better informed about the
potential value implications, we present to the panels the results of a
special survey of the major stakeholder groups. These surveys contain
the stakeholders' value trees, i.e. representations of their values and
attributes to evaluate policy options in a tree-like, hierarchical
structure. 2 4 The panels can also opt to invite spokespersons of
stakeholder groups as witnesses in order to clarify value issues and
explain claims of potential violation of group interests.
The Decision Making Process within Citizen Panels
Table 1, below, lists the operational sequence of citizen panels.
There are three major tasks: (1) presentation of technical information and
options through lectures, field tours, videos, and hearings; (2)
processing of information in small group discussions, plenary sessions,
and hearings; and .(3) evaluation of options through discussions,
questionnaires, and formal procedures to elicit preferences. Procedures
for these three tasks are derived from multiattribute utility (MAU)
theory. 25
24 R. KEENEYETAL, DIE WERTBAUMANALYSE (1984); D. VON WINTERFELDT & W.
EDWARDS, DECISION ANALYSIS AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (1986) [hereinafter
DECISION ANALYsIs].

25 Edwards, Expert Measurement and Mechanical Combination, 13
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE 171 (1972); DECISION
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Table 1
Typical Sequence of Events in a Citizen Panel
Step
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Activity
Introduce issue through lecture and field tour.
Provide background knowledge through lectures, written material, selfeducating group sessions, audiovisual information, field tours, etc.
Introduce controversial interpretations of information through videos or
hearings.
Introduce options through lectures (non-controversial) or hearings
(controversial).
Problem structuring with respect to each option through group
sessions and plenary discussions.
Elicit values and develop criteria to evaluate each option.
Evaluate information and options through individual questionnaires
and group discussions (captured in group response forms).
Draft rough recommendations through work groups and plenary sessions.
Articulate recommendations in a citizens' report after the planning
cells by the facilitator.
Provide citizens' report to participants (usually in an evening meeting
two months after the planning cells).
Present the citizens' report to the sponsor, the media, and interested groups.

In contrast to the usual MAU procedure, numerical results of the
decision process are not used as the final judgment of the participant;
instead, they are only an aid to improve the participant's holistic
judgment. The advantage of the MAU model - to break down a
complex problem and structure a productive discussion - is used to its
fullest extent without accepting the rigid rule of combining the scaled
results into a single dimension. Final recommendations are always
based on a holistic judgment by the individual participants.
ANALYSIS,

supra note 24.
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Table 2
Phases of Decision Making by Citizen Panels
Phase

Explanation

1

Structure problem

2

Elicit values

3

Validate values

4

Present or
generate options

'5

Evaluate options

6

Weight dimensions

7

Request
holistic judgment
Feedback of
calculated judgment

Identify problems with present solution;
describe options and decision procedure
Identify personal values affected by the
decision; structure values in tree format
Transpose values into evaluative criteria and
dimensions; amalgamate personal value trees
into a joint value tree
Introduce options and explain experts'
judgments on the potential advantages
and disadvantages of each option
Assess each option on each dimension
according to personal utilities (identify
assessment ranges for all participants)
Assign cardinal weights to each dimension
(using one of the usual calibration techniques)
Individual and group judgment on prioritizing
options
Calculate numerical priorities derived from the
MAU model and inform participants of the
results
Interview each participant about differences
between holistic and calculated results;
search for explanations of these differences
Individual decision and plenary vote for each
option; write narrative vote for summarizing
one's arguments for the choice made

Step

8
9

Discuss
potential discrepancies

10

Final
holistic judgment

The structure of the decision making process is summarized in Table
2 and schematically represented in Figure 2.
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Figure 2
Schematic of Citizen Panel Process
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options to help define choices for the panelists, and (iii) argue for their
adoption based upon the consistency of the decision option with the
explicitly expressed values. The facilitator performs the technical aspects
of the utility analysis and inserts these back into the process, while also
organizing and moderating the actual panel meetings.
Distinct Characteristics of Citizen Panels
A random selection process is preferable to a stratified sample of
relevant social groups. Randomly selected citizens are uncommitted to a
position, and thus can take advantage of new information and adjust
their preferences accordingly. Moreover, other affected citizens can
identify with randomly selected participants because of the equal chance
to be drawn into the sample. This adds to the legitimacy of the panels.
Random selection is inspired by the goal of equal representation of all
values and preferences. Even if many citizens elect to not participate,
attempting to acquire a representative sample of the pertinent population
is democratic and furthers the legitimacy of the procedure.
The random selection process has another advantage. Since the
participants convene for only a limited time, and do not depend on each
other, they are not concerned about the social status and power of each
individual member outside the panel. The panel represents a working
group of equal influence and power. Personal ambitions to dominate the
process are not tolerated by the group members; nobody has anything to
lose by speaking up. Thus, the process itself comes close to the ideal of
a discourse as Habermas and others have postulated for policy
making. 26
In contrast to voting by elected bodies, members of citizen panels
work on only one issue and do not need support from voters or interest
26 J. HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY (1979);

Kemp,

Planning,Public Hearings,and the Politics of Discourse,in CRITICAL THEORY AND
PUBLIC LIFE (J. Forester ed. 1985).
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groups. They represent their own preferences and do not link their work
on the panel with political career ambitions. The limited participation
period prevents the citizens from becoming alienated from their usual
social roles: they only change their perspectives for a brief period.
Participants in Germany received an honorarium and a working
contract. The purpose of the contract was to convey the perception of
seriousness on the part of the sponsor, indicate that the person was
serving a purpose (being a "value consultant"), and assure an
atmosphere of work ethics and responsibility.
Citizen panels differ from other forms of participation by
disallowing organized stakeholders or officials to contribute directly to
the output recommendations. This could present a problem if
stakeholders and public officials disapprove strongly with the final
recommendations, however, the model does allow them to testify during
the process. Stakeholders and public officials would tend to control the
discussions and limit the agenda to first and second level conflict items.
Their taking part would violate the principle of creating an environment
where social status and political power do not matter. Moreover,
decision makers - unlike most citizens - have usually made up their
minds about the issues and would try to use the process to influence
other members rather then to reconsider information and engage in a
learning experience.
In short, the citizen panel format deals with several of the challenges
in designing public participatory processes. It ensures that citizen values
are highlighted to avoid emphasizing technical issues, while providing
technical information resources to citizens. The use of a neutral
facilitator reduces the potential for perceived bias in the organization of
the panels, and random selection meets the requirement that each citizen
have an equal chance to participate.
Citizen panels work best when a problem can be resolved in a short
2 RISK - Issues in Health &Safety 197 [Summer 1991]

time, no major inequities occur, and several solutions (not narrowly
technical or political) are available. The approach does not work well for
issues that pose major inequities for different regions or social groups,
since randomly selected citizens are not seen as legitimate negotiators for
these groups. Yes/no issues, such as siting facilities, are also
inappropriate since participants may feel obliged to select the no-action
option. Decisions which need to be adapted over time also cannot be
handled with this approach, since the panel relies on its temporary
nature for optimal functionality. In addition, some decision issues may
require more time than is practically available to citizen panels.
Despite these limitations, citizen panels seem especially suited for
issues of risk management. Risk issues often involve many different
types of conflict. A holistic understanding of the impacts of a proposed
project must be based on scientific and technical conventions, beliefs of
organizational competency, and personal preferences. In the end, it is
the citizens' estimation and interpretation of impacts that will govern
their decision to contribute. Because the citizen panel approach is
explicitly designed to fit this type of problem structure, it offers a unique
alternative to the routine forms of public participation.
A Case Study of Citizen Panels in the U.S.
In 1988 the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
(NJDEP) awarded a research grant to the Center for Environment,
Technology, and Development (CENTED) at Clark University to test
the method of citizen panels in the area of sewage sludge management.
A research project had been proposed by Rutgers University to apply
sludge to their experimental farm in Hunterdon County and a permit
from NJDEP was required. The objective of the contract with Clark
University was to involve the local public in a discussion about the
potential risks and benefits of the proposed project. The NJDEP hoped
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the citizen panel would issue conditions for a draft permit, which would
then be subject to the usual permitting process (public hearings).
As a option for sewage sludge management, land application has
become more prominent as new laws prohibit ocean dumping and
landfill disposal, and lead times for the construction of incinerators
lengthen. 2 7 An advantage of land application is that the sludge is
recycled, serving as fertilizer for crops, and reducing the amount of
chemical fertilizer needed. 28 Possible risks involve contamination of
soil, crops, or water by organic and inorganic components of the
sludge, and transport and storage of the sludge. Additionally, there are
potential problems with odor, and secondary economic, social, or
aesthetic impacts.
Despite the fact that the New Jersey regulations for land application
of sludge are widely considered to be among the strictest in the country,
draft permits have encountered fierce public opposition and community
protests. In addition to health and odor concerns, citizens living near
proposed sites have worried about the long term impacts, the role of the
regulatory agency, and the permitting process. 29 The NJDEP expected
that citizen involvement would offer opportunity for the affected public
to suggest conditions under which research into land application could
ensue without opposition. If these conditions were adopted into the
permit, citizen trust of the agency and acceptance of land application
might increase.
The first stage of the project was to review transcripts from public
hearings held in New Jersey and New York on land application
permitting. The research team also spent several days in Hunterdon
27 Marshall, The Sludge Factor,242 SCIENCE 507 (1988).
28 A. PAGE, T. LOGAN & J. RYAN, LAND APPLICATION OF SLUDGE (1987);
PENNSYLVANIA

AGRICULTURAL

EXPERIMENT

STATION,

CRITERIA

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAND APPUCAlION OF SLUDGES IN THE NORTHEAST, BUqLETN

851 (1985).
29 CrMN PARTICIPATION, supra note 17.
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County interviewing local officials, potential stakeholders, and local
opinion leaders. These data were used to design measures by which
citizens could evaluate the performance of the various options on the
different value dimensions.
The second step was to ask experts in land application of sewage
sludge to evaluate the risks involved with this proposed sludge research
project, and judge the effectiveness of the New Jersey regulations at
mitigating these risks. For this purpose, a Group Delphi was held in
October bf 1988, in which nine national experts participated.
Figure 330
Expert Assessments of the Relative Risks of Heavy Metals
in Land Applied Sewage Sludge
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Figure 3 is an example of the results of the Group Delphi. It shows
the expert assessments (three groups) of the relative risks of heavy
30 The confidence level for Group 1 (solid black) is 95%, for Group 2 (dark) is 90%
and for Group 3 (light) is 80%.
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metals typically found in municipal sewage sludge (assuming the sludge
were to be applied without the state regulations in place). With state
regulations in place, the risks were assessed to be negligible, with the
exception of lead. The Group Delphi clearly revealed a consensus that
the New Jersey regulations did not adequately restrict lead
contamination; but were more than adequate in regulating all other
contaminants, as well as all aspects of the application process.
Deviations from the West German Model
This was the first attempt to use the German-derived model of
citizen panels in the U.S. The major question for the application of the
panel model in the U.S. was: What kind of modifications are necessary
to adjust the model to the U.S. political culture? The West German
political context in which the model was developed differs in some key
areas from the U.S.:
- Americans have more capacity to influence government decision
making than Germans. 3 1 Americans expect to be involved in political
decision making (at least on decisions affecting their own livelihood or
community) while Germans feel honored when asked to participate.
However, this difference between the two political cultures is fading. In
Germany, a participatory orientation is emerging, 3 2 and the typical
U.S. citizen feels more and more alienated from the political decision
making process.
- Americans believe twice as often as do Germans that they can help
to change unjust regulation. 33 Americans tend to rate the efficacy of
31 G. ALMOND & S. VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE: POLITICAL ATITIUDESAND
DEMOCRACYIN FIVE NATIONS (1961) [hereinafter THE CIVIC CULTURE]; Abramovitz,
The United States:PoliticalCulture under Stress, in THE Civic CULTURE REV=SiTED
(G. Almond & S. Verba eds. 1980); Conradt, Changing German PoliticalCulture,
in THE CiviC CULTURE REVISITED (G. Almond & S. Verba eds.1980) [hereinafter
ChangingGermanPoliticalCulture].

32 Changing German PoliticalCulture, supra note 31.

2 RISK - Issues in Health &Safety 197 [Summer 1991]

protest behavior higher than do Germans. 34 Germans are likely to use
unconventional forms of participation if they are dissatisfied with the
government since they believe that conventional forms would not be
effective. The U.S. system provides citizens with more possibilities for
influencing the political decision making process so that unconventional
means are only selected if all other means appear to fail.
* Civil servants in Germany emphasize the role elements of "broker"
and "legalist" more than their American colleagues and confine their role
to interpretation of laws. U.S. civil servants on the other hand
concentrate on the functions of "advocate" or "facilitator". German civil
servants are usually appointed for life and serve under changing
governments; they perceive themselves as "non-partisan executioners"
of the common good. 35 Civil servants in the U.S. feel attached to the
administration that brought them into office and tend to adjust their
actions in accordance with the political program or philosophy. As a
result, the German public perceives its civil servants as impartial
functionaries, whereas Americans tend to associate special interests with
different civil service sectors. However, the impartial image of German
civil servants has been changing during the last decade and is
36
increasingly challenged by new social movements.
* In Germany, regulations and standards are designed by a selected
"club" of national elites, including well-known scientists, professional
societies, the unions, and industry. 37 Outside interest groups have
33 TH-m Cic CULTURE, supra note 31.
34 S. BARNES & M. KAASE, POLITICAL ACTION: MASS PARTICIPATION IN FIVE
WSimRN DEMOCRACIES (1979).
35 E. BAUMAN & 0. RENN, AIR QUALITY STANDARDS AND REGULATORY STYLEs IN
WEST GERMANY AND THE UNiTED STATES (Center for Environment, Technology and
Development Research Report No. 4, 1989).
36 Kitschelt, New Social Movements in West-Germany and the United States, 5
POLITICAL POWERAND SOC. THEORY 286 (1986).

37 Renn, Risk Communication at the Community Level: EuropeanLessons from
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been only marginally involved in the regulatory process, except when it
has been in the interest of the ministry to mobilize public support for a
proposal that might not have been approved by the club. 3 8 After the
club reaches an agreement, the public is informed but not consulted. The
U.S. system has adopted a more adversarial style that is characterized
by more open conflicts and often litigation. The regulatory agencies are
obliged to make the intent to promulgate new regulations public and to
invite all interests to become involved in the decision making
39
process.
In essence, German citizens have less opportunities to participate in
regulatory policy making and to make their preferences known to the
administrators. As long as they feel that the club is doing a good job and
their interests are represented, they feel comfortable with the system.
Once they have lost trust in the administration, they are more likely to
use unconventional means of political expression. The rise of the Green
Party and the popularity of direct citizen action groups indicate that the
trust in the conventional forms of conflict resolution is fading in
particular in the area of environmental regulation. U.S. citizens, on the
other hand, do not expect that the political or administrative decision
makers will act in their best interests. They believe that checks and
balances must be in place to assure mutual control.4 0 Control includes
the right of citizens to be at least consulted, if not asked for their
approval regarding changes that might affect their well being.
In order to adjust our citizen panel model to the U.S. political culture
and context, several changes from the original concept were made and
the Seveso Directive, 39 J. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL A. 1301 (1989).

38 E. MOLLER, INNENWELTDER UMWELTPOLTI (1986).

39 O'Riordan & Wynne, Regulating Environmental Risks: A Comparative
Perspective, in INSURING

AND MANAGING HAZARDOUS RISKS: FROM SEVESO TO

BHOPALAND BEYOND 389 (P. Kleindorfer & H. Kunreuther eds. 1987).

40 Renn & Levine, Trust and Credibility in Risk Communication, in RISK

COMMUNICATION 51 (H. Jungermann, R. Kasperson & P. Wiedemann eds. 1988).
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implemented. Among them were:
- Incorporation of official stakeholders as participants of the
planning cells (as a means to accommodate the expectation of local
stakeholders to be included in the planning process).
* Invitation to all abutters of the proposed site (in order to
accommodate the common expectation that all affected citizens should
have the opportunity to participate).
0 Abandonment of all honoraria (in order to emphasize the civic duty
of public involvement and to avoid impression of bribery).
* Division of the meeting time into two consecutive weekends (in
order to make the meetings more attractive and to avoid paying
compensation for workdays lost).
Due to time and money constraints, a local coordinator was not
appointed; the research team conducted all organizational and logistical
actions. An attempt was made to have the citizens sign "contracts", as
was done in Germany. The purpose of the contracts was to underline
the seriousness of their role as value consultants; but the citizens
objected to these contracts as legalistic, so they were dropped.
Process and Results
With these modifications, we organized two parallel panels to take
place on two consecutive weekends in mid-November, 1988. One panel
consisted of randomly selected citizens and affected citizens living very
near the farm. The other panel was made up of local and regional
stakeholders who had been identified through local officials, our
interviews, and the NJDEP. It was intended that these two parallel
panels would merge during the second weekend and issue one set of
recommendations.
The envisioned program was radically altered after the participants,
especially the abutters, made it clear they rejected the proposed research
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project and felt more comfortable organizing their own meeting without
the help of a third party. During the first weekend, the two panels were
combined and the agenda altered to address the risks of land application.
During the first session of the second weekend, amidst much greater
attendance, the citizens decided to organize themselves and promised to
submit a set of recommendations within a two month period. These
were clearly geared toward the rejection of the proposed research.
During the first weekend, the citizens were able to generate a full list
of values and concerns, and perform preliminary evaluations of the
regulatory options (see Table 3). The information material from the
Group Delphi was appreciated and the merits of land application
research in general were supported. The greatest concerns of the citizens
were not the health consequences or odor, as the experts had
envisioned; rather, they were most concerned about the long term impact
that sludge application would have on the viability of farming and the
rural landscape of the town. In particular, they were concerned that the
research project might become a large scale application program. Neither
the county nor Rutgers had such plans, but the prospect of such
expansion was unsettling.

2 RISK - Issues in Health &Safety 197 [Summer 1991]

Table 3
Concerns and Priorities of Panelists
Concerns

Pre-treatment of sludge (strict parameters and
industry specific)
Education of local residents (avoid emotional
responses)
Basic distrust of DEP and other authorities
Monitoring wells on site
Prevention of groundwater contamination
Soil testing
Future monitoring of soil and groundwater
after application ceases
Transportation of sludge material
Honesty towards the citizens (not just positive
information, loss of credibility)
Removal of industrial chemicals from sludge
Removal of household chemicals
Uptake of chemicals in the food chain
Effective regulation (independent testing)
Odor
Decline of property values
Health effects from pathogens
Limitation of applied quantity
Limitation of time period for application
Image of Rutgers
Frequency of testing
"Foot in the door" problem (gradually extending
the sludge application program)
Responsibility and liability for cleanup
Runoff water
Containment of the experimental area
Timing between testing and application

Priority Group
I
11 Nf

3
3
1
5

1
1
2
2
4
2
3
4
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Transferability of the Citizen Panel Model to the U.S.
Is the citizen panel approach to public participation as it has been
used in planning problems in West Germany applicable to risk
management in the U.S.? This case study did not obtain citizen
recommendations for a draft permit (and the proposed research project
did not proceed); nor did it entirely resolve conflicts about values,
institutional competence, or scientific facts. However, under difficult
conditions, the process did successfully foster a degree of interactive
understanding between government officials, stakeholders, citizens, and
technical experts. This is uncharacteristic of most siting efforts. Citizens
did receive the educational component and interview scientific experts
and public officials; they did discuss and express their personal
concerns, values, and preferences; and some options were evaluated.
Although they were not pleased with the choice of options available, the
citizens did indicate a desire to participate early on in the policy
formation process.
Based on our experiences in West Germany and New Jersey, it
appears that some conditions for citizen panels are demanded:
- variabilityof options: the issue must have several feasible options,
each with advantages and disadvantages;
* equity of exposure: there should be a roughly equal exposure to
the disadvantages of these options among the local population;
- participationof randomly selected citizens: even controversial
issues can be dealt with if attitudes are not already polarized and if the
majority of participants are randomly selected; 4 1
- personalexperience: citizens should have enough experience with
the issue that they feel confident about learning and discussing options;
* openness of sponsor: the sponsor must be willing to seriously
41 Dienel & Garbe, supra note 20; Sozialvertrgliche Energiepolitik, supra note

16.
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consider the recommendations of the panel.
It is still unclear whether an honorarium should be offered to the
participants. The advantage of showing respect for people's effort and
time must be weighed against the potential for misperceiving it as
bribery.
Our experiment with citizen panels taught us that the process of
public involvement is as much an issue of controversy for Americans as
is the subject matter itself. German citizens seem more willing to accept
given agendas and adhere to a specified time frame. By contrast, U.S.
experts, politicians, stakeholders, and citizens all felt comfortable
questioning the agenda and spending more time on items they felt were
unfinished.
The experience of participants' dissatisfaction with the process and.
the agenda underlines the importance of having a local coordinator.
Such a person might have identified community traits and preceding
events which could possibly inhibit the panels. A few weeks earlier,
county officials had decided to site the county solid waste landfill near
the research farm, and local residents were in no mood to trust the state
DEP or another research project team with whom they had no
affiliations. A local coordinator could have alerted the research team to
this condition. In addition, early communication among the local
coordinator, potential participants, and members of the research team
might have eased the tensions that were built up as a result of the
citizens' unfamiliarity with the process and its objectives.
The success of public involvement will depend on securing approval
of the process by the affected constituencies. The social climate of
distrust of government agencies and their contractors is partly expressed
as skepticism toward new procedures. Citizens must be involved in the
design of the procedure and the agenda, despite that this may evoke
conflicts that displace the actual conflict. We agree with Crosby [CNDP,
1985], that it is advisable to hold a meeting with the participants at least
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two weeks before the citizen panels are convened to discuss the process,
agenda, and informational material; and to given the citizens a chance to
alter the tine frame or agenda.
Conclusions
A potential conflict exists between the rights of citizens to take part
in discussions on risk-related issues, and the responsibility of
government agencies to manage hazards in a cost-effective manner. The
philosophy behind citizen panels is that citizens, experts, and
stakeholders can resolve this dilemma through their respective expertise.
Stakeholders are valuable sources for concerns and criteria to *evaluate
options,, since their interests are at stake. Experts are needed to provide
technical data and point out relations between options and impacts.
Citizens must live with the consequences, and are therefore the best
judges to evaluate the options. Citizen panels are intended to bring these
three perspectives together in a productive fashion.
Any public participation must be perceived as fair and legitimate.
The experience with citizen panels shows that the structure of the
process is capable of providing an arena for addressing conflicts at the
factual, managerial, and value levels of the debate. The acceptability of
the process depends on the right of the participants to be involved in
setting the agenda and defining the policy options wherever feasible. A
fair procedure, however, does not insure citizens will select the best
technical solution or the option favored by the risk management agency.
Citizens may understand the technical dimensions, but choose another
option more consistent with their values.
The authors believe the public is capable of comprehending complex
issues and making decisions beyond those which maximize their own
personal gain. Most people take the responsibility of community
involvement extremely seriously. Successful public involvement
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depends on there being a procedure which supports discourse and full
consideration of evidence, rationales, and options. With such a tool,
citizens will articulate well-considered policy recommendations. A
procedure that allows citizens to demonstrate their potential, and
includes technical and political knowledge needed for holistic analysis,
would enhance society's ability to manage risks. The proof of this
assertion will lie in further experimentation with innovative procedures.
Citizen panels are one way, but certainly not the only way, to
accomplish the goal of bringing rationality and democratic involvement
into decision making and policy formation. Through participation,
rationality is enhanced; and through rationality, participation is
facilitated. We hope to be able to prove this claim by adding additional
case studies to the body of knowledge on participation and to further
contribute to the design and implementation of new participatory
techniques.

